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Administrative Law
by Martin M. Wilson*
Jennifer A. Blackburn**
Courtney E. Ferrell***
and Erin G. Watstein....
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the
Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2013 through May 31, 2014 in
which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case.'
The Article begins with a discussion of cases on exhaustion of administrative remedies, followed by a series of cases discussing statutory
construction. The next topic discussed will be the standard of review of
an agency decision, with a review of sovereign immunity cases to follow,
and the Article concludes with a brief review of enactments from the
2014 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly.

* Partner in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University
(B.A., 1975); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., with honors, 1978).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.A., 2000); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2004).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College
& State University (B.A., 2004); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D.,
2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**** Associate in the firm of Troutman Sanders LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgetown
University, Walsh School of Foreign Service (B.S., 2006); University of Florida, Levin
College of Law (J.D., 2009). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia administrative law during the prior survey period, see
Martin M. Wilson, Jennifer A. Blackburn & Courtney E. Ferrell, Administrative Law,
Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 65 MERCER L. REV. 41 (2013).
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II. EXHAUSTION OF ADMTNISTRATIVE REMEDIES
While this year saw no major changes in the well-established doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, the courts had the opportunity
to reaffirm the doctrine across a wide range of topics including commercial loans, the firing of a school superintendent, and the Cavalia
traveling horse show. Two cases, Olde Towne yrone, LLC v. Multibank
2009-1 CRE Venture, LLC2 and Gravitt v. Bank of the Ozarks,3 both
decided within three days of each other, re-examined the limitation on
Institutions Reform, Recovery,
judicial review imposed by the Financial
4
(FIRREA).
Act
Enforcement
and
In Olde Thwne 7rone, LLC, the court of appeals noted that in
enacting FIRREA, Congress established an administrative review
process for claims against failed banks for which the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been appointed as receiver.5
Anticipating the large number of claims the FDIC would receive from
various parties, Congress included limitations on judicial review of such
claims.6 Claimants who fall within the scope of these limitations must
first exhaust their administrative remedies through the FDIC prior to
appealing to the court.' Failure to do so divests courts of subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim.8 Furthermore, these protections are
available to an entity that purchases a failed lending institution's assets
from the FDIC, thereby allowing them to pursue dismissal of the case for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 9 While the claimant argued
that FIRREA was not applicable because the FDIC chose not to assign
the purchasing entity its "other rights, powers or privileges"'0 under 12
U.S.C. § 1821(d)," the court clarified that FIRREA's administrative
exhaustion provision is a jurisdictional prerequisite that is binding on
the courts and not a "right, power or privilege" at the discretion of the
FDIC to assign."
In Gravitt, the appellants urged the court to adopt an alternative
approach used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

326 Ga. App. 322, 756 S.E.2d 558 (2014).
326 Ga. App. 461, 756 S.E.2d 695 (2014).
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) (2012).
Old Town Tyrone, LLC, 326 Ga. App. at 325, 756 S.E.2d at 561.
Id.
Id. at 325-26, 756 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. at 326, 756 S.E.2d at 562.
Id.
Id. at 328, 756 S.E.2d at 563.
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (2012).
Old Town Tyrone, LLC, 326 Ga. App. at 328, 756 S.E.2d at 563.
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Columbia Circuit and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit that does not recognize FIRREA as a jurisdictional bar for claims
brought against a purchasing entity for its own actions after purchasing
a failed lending institution's assets and liabilities from the FDIC. The
court rejected this request and instead relied on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit's broad construction of FIRREA,
holding that because appellants asserted their counterclaims after the
appointment of the FDIC as receiver, the claims were within the scope
of FIRREA's protections.' 3 Since the appellants failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies regarding such claims, the superior court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction, and the counterclaims were properly
dismissed.14

In Miller County Board of Education v. McIntosh,'5 interpretation of
the administrative remedies available under an employment agreement
(the Employment Agreement)'s termination clause was at issue."6 The
Miller County Board of Education (the Board) terminated Robert
McIntosh as superintendent of the Miller County Schools by letter on
November 13, 2012. The letter stated there would be a hearing before
a Board-appointed tribunal, provided that McIntosh requested such a
hearing by December 7, 2012. Otherwise, his right to a hearing would
be waived. In his reply on November 21, 2012, McIntosh disputed the
basis for his termination and stated that both parties would have to
work together to obtain a mutually agreeable hearing date. No tribunal
was ever appointed and no hearing date was ever set. Following the
filing of a suit by McIntosh against the Board on January 29, 2013,
alleging breach of the Employment Agreement, the Board responded that
McIntosh failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because his
response was both late and substantively insufficient. 7
While the Board asserted the Employment Agreement's seven-day
response period to the written statement of charges commenced with
their mailing of the letter, the clause provided McIntosh was to be given
the written statement of charges and then must respond within seven
days. The Board's interpretation that McIntosh was given the charges
on the date the letter was mailed would put him at the mercy of the
vagaries of the mail regarding the time he had to respond once the letter
was received.'
The court warned that "any interpretation of the

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Gravitt, 326 Ga. App. at 467-68, 756 S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 468, 756 S.E.2d at 702.
326 Ga. App. 408, 756 S.E.2d 641 (2014).
Id. at 408, 756 S.E.2d at 643.
Id. at 409-10, 756 S.E.2d at 644.
Id. at 412, 756 S.E.2d at 645-46.
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termination provision that possibly results in McIntosh being prevented
from filing a timely response is patently absurd and will not be adopted
by this Court." 9 Instead, the date McIntosh was given the charges
would be the date he received the letter.2 0 Since the last day McIntosh
was permitted to file his response fell on a holiday, the response was not
due until the following business day.2 ' McIntosh met this filing
deadline, and therefore, his response was timely.22
Regarding the sufficiency of the response, nothing in the Employment
Agreement required McIntosh to provide a detailed response to the
Board's statement of charges.23 As such, the court held that McIntosh's
response was sufficient to meet his contractual obligations under the
Employment Agreement.24 Since McIntosh's response was both timely
and sufficient, the Board's contention that he failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies was incorrect, and the superior court properly
dismissed it.25
The final case discussed in this section involves an unsuccessful, albeit
creative, argument asserting the defendant was barred from defending
an action brought by a third party for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies with the city.26

The dispute arose from Noble Parking,

Inc. (Noble)'s non-conforming use of a parking lot as a park-for-hire lot
following the use of the lot for the Cavalia USA, Inc.'s traveling horse
show. The City of Atlanta Office of Buildings informed Noble that the
legal non-conforming use of the parking lot as a park-for-hire facility had
been superseded by the permitted use of the parking lot for the horse
show. Centergy North and Tuff Parking, the owners of the property
where the parking lot was located, subsequently filed for injunctive relief
seeking to enjoin Noble from operating its park-for-hire business on the
property. The city intervened in the action and similarly filed a
complaint for injunctive relief. The trial court ruled that Noble's claim
was barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because they
did not appeal the city's zoning decision regarding the non-conforming
use within thirty days as required under the city code.27

19. Id. at 412, 756 S.E.2d at 646.

20. Id.
21. Id. at 413, 756 S.E.2d at 646.
22. Id.

23. Id.
24. Id. at 414, 756 S.E.2d at 647.

25. Id.
26. See Noble Parking, Inc. v. Centergy One Assoc., LLC, 326 Ga. App. 455, 458, 756
S.E.2d 691, 694 (2014).
27. Id. at 456-57, 756 S.E.2d at 692-93.
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The court of appeals noted that it found no authority, nor did the
appellees cite any cases, holding that a defendant is barred from
defending an action brought initially by a third party for failure to
exhaust its administrative remedies with the city.2" Here, the action
arose over a dispute between two private parties, with one party seeking
to enjoin the other party's use of its property.29 While the city later
intervened in the action, Noble did not seek a "declaration [by] a court
of equity,' ° nor did it "circumvent the review process" by issuing a
collateral attack of the city's zoning decision."
Noble could have
appealed the city's zoning decision to the Board of Zoning Appeals, but
instead chose not to pursue an appeal; thus, Noble became subject to
penalty for violating the city's zoning ordinance. 2 The court held that
Noble was under no obligation to exhaust its administrative remedies
with the city in order to defend itself in an action brought by private
parties. 33
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
An agency's construction of the governing statute that it is charged
with administering and a court's interpretation of that agency's
construction can at times become the central issue in a case. For
example, in Georgia Department of Revenue v. Moore, 4 the court of
appeals denied the Georgia Department of Revenue (the DepartmentYs
attempt to collect sales taxes from a second responsible party after the
Department voluntarily settled a refund action with the first responsible
party.35 The voluntary payment doctrine, section 13-1-13 of the Official
Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.), 5 was the basis for the court's
decision. 7 The Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the voluntary payment doctrine is a concept applicable to contracts,
not tax indebtedness.38

28. Id. at 457, 756 S.E.2d at 693.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Powell v. City of Snellville, 266 Ga. 315, 316, 467 S.E.2d 540, 541
(1996)).
31. Id. (quoting Mortg. Alliance Corp. v. Pickens Cnty., 316 Ga. App. 755, 757, 730

S.E.2d 471, 473 (2012)).
32. Id. at 458, 756 S.E.2d at 693.
33. Id. at 458, 756 S.E.2d at 694.
34. 294 Ga. 20, 751 S.E.2d 57 (2013).

35. Id. at 20, 751 S.E.2d at 58.
36. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-13 (2010).
37. Moore, 294 Ga. at 20, 751 S.E.2d at 58.

38. Id. at 22, 751 S.E.2d at 59.
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In Fulton County Board of Education v. D.R.H.,3 9 the Georgia Court
of Appeals dealt with the parameters of judicial review of local board
decisions.4 ° In this case, the court of appeals determined that the trial
court overstepped its authority when it failed to confine its review of a
student's expulsion to the record. 41 As O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e)42
requires review to be confined to the record, the court of appeals ruled
that the superior court's consideration of future injury (evidence of which
was not presented during the hearing before the local school board) was
improper and in violation of the statute.4 3
The last case in this section, Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. v.
Turner," involved the ever-compelling issue of standing.' This case
discusseded the Erosion and Sedimentation Act of 1975, 46 which the
Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of
Natural Resources is charged with enforcing. 47 The EPD determined
that a property owner was violating the Act by failing to maintain an
adequate buffer along the banks of a salt-water marsh area, but entered
into a consent order with the property owner that would allow him to
maintain the non-compliant bulkhead within the buffer zone. The
administrative law judge and the superior court concluded that the
Center for a Sustainable Coast had standing to appeal. 4' The Georgia
Court of Appeals, however, vacated the superior court's decision, relying
on O.C.G.A. § 12-7-12(a), 49 which states that the director of the EPD
may issue an order against a landowner when the landowner is violating
the Act.50 As this provision is discretionary, the court determined that
the Center for a Sustainable Coast's claimed "injury" was due to the
landowner's violation and that the consent order was unlikely to be
redressed by a favorable decision."

39. 325 Ga. App. 53, 752 S.E.2d 103 (2013).
40. Id. at 53-54, 752 S.E.2d at 104.
41. See id. at 58, 752 S.E.2d at 107.
42. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-1160(e) (2012).
43. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 325 Ga. App. at 58, 752 S.E.2d at 107; see also O.C.G.A.
§ 20-2-1160(e).
44. 324 Ga. App. 762, 751 S.E.2d 555 (2013).
45. Id. at 762, 751 S.E.2d at 557.
46. O.C.G.A. tit. 12 ch. 7 (2012).
47. See Turner, 324 Ga. at 762, 751 S.E.2d at 557; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-7-12(a) (2012).
48. Turner, 324 Ga. at 762-63, 766-67, 751 S.E.2d at 557, 559-60.
49. O.C.G.A. § 12-7-12(a).
50. Turner, 324 Ga. App. at 768, 751 S.E.2d at 560; see also O.C.GA. § 12-7-12(a).
51. Turner, 324 Ga. App. at 768, 751 S.E.2d at 561.
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IV.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The biggest standard of review issue in the Georgia courts this year
was the application of the "any evidence" standard to administrative
decisions. No less than four significant decisions discussing and
applying this standard were written this year. 2 In Case v. Butler, 3
the court of appeals chastised the superior court for exceeding the scope
of its review by making its own findings. 54 Specifically, the court of
appeals noted that the superior court improperly based its decision that
a terminated employee was correctly denied unemployment benefits on
a policy that was not referenced in the Board of Review (the Board)'s
decision.5 As the court of appeals stated, "The court based its ruling
on a Magnolia Manor policy that was not referenced in the Board's
decision and made specific findings with regard to Case's behavior based
on that policy. Therefore, the superior court engaged in factfinding,
which it is not permitted to do." 5 The court of appeals applied the any
evidence standard to the Board's decision-without engaging in any
improper additional factfinding-and determined that the evidence did
not support the Board's decision to deny unemployment benefits."7
V.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

An unusual number of cases evaluating Georgia's rules regarding the
doctrine of sovereign immunity were heard during this survey period,
and Georgia's courts reached varied outcomes. For example, in Georgia
Department of Natural Resources v. Center for a Sustainable Coast,
Inc.,"s the Georgia Supreme Court overruled its own precedent, holding
that sovereign immunity bars claims for injunctive relief against the
State at common law.59

Couch, °

Yet, in Georgia Department of Corrections v.

that same court held that sovereign immunity did not bar an

52. In addition to the cases discussed in detail in this section, see also Georgia
ProfessionalStandardsCommittee v. James, 327 Ga. App. 810, 761 S.E.2d 366 (2014), and
Johnson v. Butler, 323 Ga. App. 743, 748 S.E.2d 111 (2013).
53. 325 Ga. App. 123, 751 S.E.2d 883 (2013).
54. Id. at 125, 751 S.E.2d at 885.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 125-26, 751 S.E.2d at 885.
58. 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d 184 (2014).
59. Id. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 185-86.
60. 295 Ga. 469, 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

award of attorney fees and expenses under Georgia's "offer of settlement"
statute.6 '
In Center for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., the Georgia Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether sovereign immunity bars claims
for injunctive relief at common law.62

In that case, the Center for a

Sustainable Coast and two individuals (collectively, the Center) sought
to enjoin the State from issuing Letters of Permission (LOPs) to third
parties authorizing alterations to the coast that the Center contended
required a permit under the Shore Protection Act (the Act).63 To obtain
a permit under the Act, an applicant must comply with strict requirements.6 4 The permit is then submitted to a Shore Protection Committee, and the interested parties and adjoining landowners are provided
notice before any permit is granted.6 In considering whether to grant
the permit, the granting authority must then consider whether the
proposed action is unreasonably harmful and whether the project will
unreasonably interfere with conservation of marine life or public access
and enjoyment of the shore.6
While the Act contains no provision allowing for the circumvention of
the permitting process, the Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
often issued LOPs for certain projects without requiring a formal
application for actions ranging from the rebuilding of houses to the
construction of a film set.67 The Center contended that by issuing the
LOPs to authorize land alterations under the Act's jurisdiction without
adhering to the permitting requirement, "the State [was] without legal
authority under the Act to issue LOPs, and that under the State's illegal
scheme circumventing the permit process, the Center [was] denied its
rights to public notice and comment." 6 The trial court granted the
State's motion to dismiss the Center's petition, finding that the Center
could not seek declaratory relief because the State had not waived
sovereign immunity for such a suit. Accordingly, the trial court
dismissed the Center's request for injunctive relief based upon the

61. Id. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 815; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68 (2014).
62. 294 Ga. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 185.
63. Id. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 186; see also O.C.G.A. § 12-5-230 to -248 (2012 & Supp.
2014).

64.
65.
66.
67.

See O.C.GA. § 12-5-235 (a)-(b).
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-239(b).
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-239(i).
Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc. v. Ga. Dep't of Natural Res., 319 Ga. App. 205,

207, 734 S.E.2d 206, 208 (2012).

68.

Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. at 595, 755 S.E.2d at 187.
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conclusion that the claim for injunctive relief was directly dependent on
the viability of its declaratory judgment claim.69
The court of appeals held that the trial court correctly dismissed the
Center's claim for declaratory judgment but improperly dismissed the
claim for injunctive relief, concluding that "[piretermitting whether [the
Shore Protection Act] permits a claim for injunctive relief, the Center
[was] able to bring such a claim without running afoul of sovereign
immunity." ° To make this determination, the court of appeals relied
on the Georgia Supreme Court's holding in IBM v. Evans7 that "an
exception to sovereign immunity [exists] where a party seeks injunctive
relief against the state or a public official acting outside the scope of
lawful authority."7 2 The court then found that the Center had
sufficiently alleged that the State's issuance of LOPs constituted ultra
vires conduct and that common law prohibits the State from "cloak[ing]
itself in sovereign immunity while [it] perform[s] illegal acts to the
detriment of its citizens."73
The Georgia Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that its
rationale in IBM was
unsound for four reasons: (1) the clear language of our Constitution
authorizes only the General Assembly to waive sovereign immunity; (2)
our Constitution does not provide for an exception to the General
Assembly's exclusive authority to waive sovereign immunity; (3) in
IBM v. Evans [the Court] mischaracterized a waiver of sovereign
immunity as an exception to sovereign immunity; and (4) cases [the
Court] relied on in IBM v. Evans either predate the incorporation of
sovereign
immunity into our state Constitution or ignored the impact
7
thereof. 1
In rendering its decision, the court stated that it was creating "a
bright line rule that only the Constitution itself or a specific waiver by
the General Assembly can abrogate sovereign immunity [which] is more

69. Id. at 593, 755 S.E.2d at 186.
70. Ctr.for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 319 Ga. App. at 209, 734 S.E.2d at 209.
71. 265 Ga. 215, 453 S.E.2d 706 (1995).
72. Ctr.for a Sustainable Coast,Inc., 319 Ga. App. at 209, 734'S.E.2d at 209 (quoting
IBM, 265 Ga. at 216, 453 S.E.2d at 708).
73. Id.
74. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, Inc., 294 Ga. at 597, 755 S.E.2d at 188. After the
court of appeals decision, in May of 2013, legislation was enacted expressly allowing the
DNR to issue LOPs under the Act upon certain circumstances. Id. at 595, 755 S.E.2d at
187. The court, nonetheless, held that the Center's claims were not moot. Id. at 596, 755
S.E.2d at 188.
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workable than IBM v. Evans' scheme allowing judicially created
exceptions."
However, in Georgia Departmentof Corrections v. Couch, the Georgia
Supreme Court affirmed, under a different rationale than the court of
appeals, a ruling that sovereign immunity did not bar an award for
attorney fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) 6 in spite of the fact that
there is no explicit waiver." In that case, the plaintiff, David Lee
Couch, was injured when a dry-rotted joist gave way as he and other
inmates were painting the warden's house. Couch filed a premises
liability tort action against the Georgia Department of Corrections (the
Department). Before the trial, Couch made a written offer of settlement
of $24,000, which the Department rejected. After trial, the jury returned
a verdict in favor of Couch in the amount of $105,417.78 Because the
jury's verdict was more than 125% of Couch's offer of settlement, he
sought attorney fees and expenses under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-6871 (the offer
of settlement statute).,s
Based on Couch's 40% contingency fee
arrangement with his attorneys, the trial court ordered the Department
to pay Couch $49,542 in attorney fees as well as $4,782 in expenses. In
a unanimous decision, the court of appeals upheld that award, concluding that the state had waived immunity with regard to attorney fees
under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b). The Georgia Supreme Court then granted
certiorari.8 1

The supreme court noted that there was "no question that the
preconditions for an award of attorney fees and litigation expenses under
[the offer of settlement statute] were satisfied in this case."8 2 However,
the Department contended that sovereign immunity barred any such
award.83 The court evaluated the Georgia Tort Claims Act (GTCA), s4
noting that its waiver of sovereign immunity allowed Couch to bring the
tort lawsuit against the Department and to recover damages for his

75. Id. at 602, 755 S.E.2d at 191.
76. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b) (2014).
77. Couch, 295 Ga. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 815.
78. Id. at 469-70, 759 S.E.2d at 806-07.
79. O.C.GA. § 9-11-68 (2014).
80. Couch, 295 Ga. at 470, 759 S.E.2d at 807.
81. Id. at 469, 470, 759 S.E.2d at 806, 807.
82. Id. at 472, 759 S.E.2d at 808; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b). This statute applies
to a written offer to settle a tort claim made more than thirty days after the summons or
complaint and not less than thirty days before trial. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-68(b). If that offer
of settlement is rejected, and the plaintiff recovers a fimal judgment in an amount greater
than 125% of the offer, under the statute, the plaintiff is entitled to recover reasonable
attorney fees and litigation expenses. See id.
83. Couch, 295 Ga. at 472, 759 S.E.2d at 808.
84. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2013 & Supp. 2014).
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injuries.m The Department argued that an award of attorney fees
under the offer of settlement statute did not fall within the scope of the
GTCA's waiver.' However, Couch argued that "the statutory authority
for an award of attorney fees against the state under [the offer of
settlement statute was] found in the GTCA's definitions of 'claim' and
'loss' ') 7 and that attorney fees were merely "an] other element of actual
damages recoverable in actions for negligence."'8
The court noted that although an award under the offer of settlement
statute is neither an independent tort "claim" nor a component of tort
damages, it is one of the many potential costs associated with inappropriate tort litigation.8 9 As such, the court held that sovereign immunity
did not bar an award of attorney fees and expenses under the offer of
settlement statute. 90 In announcing its holding, the court stated,
[A]llowing [offer of settlement statute] awards against state defendants
ultimately should advance the fundamental purpose of sovereign
immunity, since it is entirely in the interest of the taxpayers who fund
the state treasury that the state act appropriately in litigating tort
suits brought against it pursuant to the GTCA, rather than wasting
resources in continuing to litigate weak cases after rejecting reasonable
settlement offers."
In a case of first impression, the Georgia Court of Appeals evaluated
the Georgia Department of Correction's claim that the doctrine of
sovereign immunity protected it from a surety's subrogation claims.92
In GeorgiaDepartmentof Correctionsv. Developers Surety & Indemnity
Co.," the Georgia Court of Appeals disagreed with the Department's
claims. 94 In that case, the Department entered into a construction
contract with Lewis Walker Roofing (Walker Roofing) to re-roof certain
buildings at the Valdosta State Prison. After a two-year-long delay in
completing the work, the Department declared the contract in default,
and the payment and performance bonds of the Department as an

85.

Couch, 295 Ga. at 473, 759 S.E.2d at 809.

86. Id.
87. Id. at 474, 759 S.E.2d at 809.
88.
89.
90.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 50-21-22(3)).
Id. at 480, 759 S.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 482, 759 S.E.2d at 815.

91.

Id.

92.

See Ga. Dep't of Corr. v. Developers Sur. & Indem. Co., 324 Ga. App. 371, 375, 750

S.E.2d 697, 700 (2013).
93. 324 Ga. App. 371, 750 S.E.2d 697 (2013).
94. Id. at 374, 376, 377, 379, 750 S.E.2d at 700-03.
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obligee, issued by Developers Surety and Indemnity Company (Developers Surety), were invoked. 5
Developers Surety then filed suit against the Department, alleging
that the Department breached its contract with Walker Roofing, and
sought declaratory judgment. Developers Surety argued that the
Department's breach negated Developers Surety's obligations under the
payment and performance bond it issued to Walker Roofing on behalf of
the Department. The Department argued that the State's waiver of
sovereign immunity for contract actions did not apply because Developers Surety was not a party to the construction contract between the
Department and Walker Roofing. However, Developers Surety argued
that the Department waived sovereign immunity by entering into a
contract with Walker Roofing and that the doctrine of equitable
subrogation gave Developers Surety the ability to "step into the shoes"
of Walker Roofing and file suit against the Department once Developers
Surety incurred liability by paying the obligations of its principal under
the bond.96
Looking to federal law, the court of appeals determined that the
federal government's waiver of sovereign immunity under the Tucker
Act9" for "any claim against the United States founded ... upon any
express or implied contract with the United States was not limited to
claims asserted [only] by the original parties to the contract," but that
the waiver applied to subrogees as well.9 8 Analogous to that language,
the court noted that the Constitution of Georgia does not limit the
waiver of sovereign immunity in contract actions to any particular
claimants.99 Accordingly, the court held that a subrogee stepping into
the shoes of its principal government contractor may rely upon the
waiver of sovereign immunity that applied to the government contractor. 00 In a footnote, the court observed that "[i]f the rule were otherwise, what rational business would agree to issue a payment or
performance bond to benefit the State government?"''

95. Id. at 371, 750 S.E.2d at 698.
96. Id. at 371-72, 374-75, 750 S.E.2d at 698, 700.
97. 28 U.S.C § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
98. Ga. Dep't of Corr., 324 Ga. App. at 375, 750 S.E.2d at 701 (first alteration in
original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 376, 750 S.E.2d at 701.
101. Id. at 376 n.4, 750 S.E.2d at 701 n.4.
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VI. RECENT LEGISLATION
Possibly due to a short session and the fact that 2014 is an election
year, the Georgia General Assembly did not pass many enactments with
major changes to administrative agencies at its regular session. The
following are the more prominent measures that were enacted:
1. The Georgia World Congress Center Authority has acquired the
10 2
power to provide benefit programs to its employees.
2. Two enactments revised the authority and powers of the Jekyll
10 3
Island-State Park Authority.
3. A Georgia Geospatial Advisory Council was created. 4
4. The Flint River Drought Protection Act was changed to provide new
powers to the director and to provide irrigation requirements." 5
5. The Georgia Child Support Commission has received additional
powers in an enactment primarily aimed at child support calcula0 6
tions.
6. A new High School Athletics Overview Committee was created
primarily to oversee athletic association activities. 07
7. The Georgia Student Finance Commission and the Georgia Student
Finance Authority have received revisions to their powers and duties.'
8. There is no longer a Georgia Medical Center Authority.' 9
9. The Georgia Government Transparency and Campaign Finance
Commission (formerly the ethics commission) is now assigned to the
State Accounting Office for budgetary purposes."0

102. Ga. H.R. Bill 246 §§ 1-2, Reg. Seas. (2014) (codified at O.C.GA. § 10-9-4(b)(4)
(Supp. 2014) & O.C.G.A. § 45-18-54(d) (Supp. 2014)).
103. Ga. H.R. Bill 715 §§ 1-3, Reg. Seas. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 12-3-231, -243, 243.1 (Supp. 2014)); Ga. S. Bill 296, §§ 1-3, Reg. Sess. (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 12-3-231, 243, -243.1).
104. Ga. S. Bill 361 § 1, Reg. Seas. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-5-9 (Supp. 2014)).
105. Ga. S. Bill 213 §§ 1-6, Reg. Seas. (2014) (amending O.C.G.A. §§ 12-5-541, -542, 544, -546, -549 (Supp. 2014), and enacting O.C.GA. §§ 12-5-546.1, -546.2 (Supp. 2014)).
106. Ga. S. Bill 282 §§ 1-13, Reg. Seas. (2014) (amending various provisions of O.C.G.A.
tit. 19 ch. 6 & tit. 19 ch.11 (Supp. 2014)).
107. Ga. S. Bill 288 § IA, Reg. Seas. (2014) (enacting O.C.G.A. §§ 20-2-2100 to -2104
(Supp. 2014)).
108. Ga. H.R. Bill 697 §§ 1-7, Reg. Seas. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 20-3-236, -264, 314, -316, -316.1 (Supp. 2014), and repealing O.C.G.A. § 20-3-409 (2012)).
109. Ga. H.R. Bill 513 § 1, Reg. Seas. (2014) (formerly codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 20 ch.
15 (2012 & Supp. 2014)).
110. Ga. S. Bill 297 §§ 1-2, Reg. Seas. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 21-5-30, -34 (Supp.
2014)).
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10. There is now a Georgia Council on Lupus Education and Awareness.111
11. An Alzheimer's Disease Registry was created within the Department of Public Health." 2
is required to be created
12. A Maternal Mortality Review Committee
113
under the Department of Public Health.
13. The Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental
Disabilities has received altered powers, duties, and administrative
responsibilities." 4
14. The Georgia State Board of Accountancy has received statutory
115
updates and has become a division of the State Accounting Office.
15. The Georgia Auctioneers Commission may no longer issue
apprentice auctioneer licenses." 6
16. The State Board of Barbers has received limitations on the amount
of fines that it may impose." 7
17. Likewise, the State Board of Cosmetology has also received
limitations on fines, along with lower minimum-age requirements for the
occupation." 8
18. There is a new Interstate Compact on Juveniles, along with
provisions for a commission, administrator, and a state council." 9
19. There is now a Georgia Downtown Renaissance Fund Act created
for local government assistance and handled by the commissioner of
community affairs.'20

111. Ga. S. Bill 352 § 2, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 31 ch. 49 (Supp.
2014)).
112. Ga. H.R. Bill 966 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.GA. § 31-2A-17 (Supp.
2014)).
113. Ga. S. Bill 273 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-2A-16 (Supp.
2014)).
114. Ga. S. Bill 349 §§ 1-8, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A § 37-1-20 (Supp.
2014), and various sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 37 ch. 2 (Supp. 2014)).
115. Ga. H.R. Bill 291 §§ 1-1 to 1-3, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 43-1-9
(Supp. 2014), and various sections of O.C.GA. tit. 43 ch. 3 (Supp. 2014) & O.C.G.A. § 505B-2 (Supp. 2014)).
116. Ga. H.R. Bill 1042 §§ 1-12 (2014) (codified at various sections of O.C.G.A. tit. 43
ch. 6 (Supp. 2014)).
117. Ga. S. Bill 337 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 43-7-23 (Supp. 2014)).
118. Ga. S. Bill 336 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.GA. § 43-10-14 (Supp. 2014)).
119. Ga. H.R. Bill 898 §§ 1-1 to 3-3, Reg. Sess. (2014) (repealing former O.C.G.A. tit.
39 ch. 3 (2012), enacting O.C.GA tit. 49 ch. 4B (Supp. 2014), and amending O.C.G.
§§ 15-11-10 (2014), 49-4A-7 (Supp. 2014), 49-5-8 (Supp. 2014)).
120. Ga. H.R. 128 § 1, Reg. Sess. (2014) (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 5-8-260, -261 (Supp.
2014)).

